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 In The Federalist No. 47, James Madison warns, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or 
many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”1 To prevent such 
tyranny, the separation of powers among the three branches of government has 
existed since the founding of the U.S. government.2 The separation of governmental 
powers was also adopted by the individual states, posing as a restriction and barrier 
to prevent any one branch of government from becoming too powerful, thus creating 
a balance of power.3 Despite this idealistic framework, the judicial branch often 
exercises the most authority, operating without supervision or approval from the 
other two branches.4 The decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State 
v. Saldierna5 is an example of judicial power and the court’s ability to mold current 
legislation, through statutory interpretation, to its own belief of how a law should be 
read, interpreted, and applied despite the legislature’s intent.
 In Saldierna, the court considered, as a matter of first impression, whether a 
juvenile’s request to call his mother during a custodial interrogation was an invocation 
of the juvenile’s statutorily protected right to have a parent present during questioning, 
as established under section 7B-2101(a)(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes,6 
or whether such a request was too ambiguous to warrant protection of the right.7 The 
Saldierna court held that a juvenile’s right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian 
present during police questioning is a state constitutional right and is not controlled 
by established precedent concerning the invocation of federal constitutional rights.8 
Precedent requires a suspect to clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously invoke a 
federal constitutional right and does not require law enforcement officials to clarify a 
suspect’s ambiguous statement.9 As a result of its holding, the Saldierna court created 
1. The Federalist No. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
2. See U.S. Const. arts. I–III (creating the three branches of government and their respective powers).
3. See generally Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 
467 (2011).
4. See, e.g., All. for Justice, The Roberts Court and Judicial Overreach (2013) (expanding this 
assertion in a discussion of the Roberts Court).
5. 775 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
6. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(a) (2015) (amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(b) (1998)).
7. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 327.
8. Id. at 333. A juvenile’s right to have a parent present during questioning “is an additional protection 
specifically granted through [the] Juvenile Code to the children of [North Carolina], a right which goes 
beyond the protections offered to adult suspects during interrogations.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Federally 
established constitutional rights include: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) that anything you say can and 
will be used against you in court; and (3) the right to consult with an attorney and have one appointed if 
not currently represented by one. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
9. Both U.S. and North Carolina Supreme Court precedent require a person to clearly and unequivocally 
invoke a constitutional right. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (requiring a suspect to 
unambiguously articulate a desire to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation to invoke the 
constitutional right to have an attorney present); State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 225 (N.C. 2000) 
(holding that a juvenile defendant must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent and law 
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a new rule and standard requiring law enforcement officers to clarify the meaning 
behind “an ambiguous statement touching on a juvenile’s right to have a parent 
present during an interrogation.”10
 This case comment contends that the Saldierna court erred in holding that law 
enforcement officers are required to clarify the meaning behind a juvenile’s ambiguous 
statement that possibly invoked his right to have a parent present during a custodial 
interrogation.11 This holding was contrary to the intent of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court to hold a juvenile’s right to have a parent present during questioning 
to the same standard as the other rights enumerated in section 7B-2101(a). This intent 
is also evidenced by the North Carolina General Assembly’s (NCGA)12 intentional 
construction of section 7B-2101, which shows that section 7B-2101(a)(3) is not to be 
held to a different standard than the other three constitutional protections codified in 
the statute.13 Additionally, the Saldierna court supported its holding by citing to a 
prospective amendment of section 7B-2101, set to take effect December 1, 2015, which 
the court acknowledged had no applicability to or effect on the question at bar.14 
Ultimately, the Saldierna decision creates a public policy concern by manifesting 
judicial overreach, which occurs when appellate courts interpret and shape legislation 
beyond the intent of the legislators who promulgated it.15
 In January 2013, sixteen-year-old Felix Saldierna was arrested in South Carolina 
by Charlotte-Mecklenburg police for outstanding burglary and vandalism charges 
related to incidents that occurred in Charlotte, North Carolina, in 2012.16 Saldierna 
was transported to Moss Justice Center, a juvenile facility located in York County, 
South Carolina, for booking and questioning.17 Detective Aimee Kelly of the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department conducted an audio-recorded interview 
with Saldierna in the booking area of the facility.18
 Before asking any questions, Detective Kelly advised Saldierna of his rights 
pursuant to section 7B-2101(a), which states the following:
enforcement is not required to clarify a juvenile’s meaning behind an ambiguous statement touching on 
a constitutional right).
10. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 334.
11. Id.
12. The NCGA is the legislative body within the state of North Carolina, consisting of the House of 
Representatives and Senate, that is responsible for creating the laws of the state and codifying them in 
statutes. See N.C. Const. art. II, § 1.
13. See discussion infra pp. 183–86 (expanding this assertion).
14. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 334. Section 7B-2101 was amended in May 2015 to prevent any juvenile under 
sixteen years of age from waiving the right to have a parent present while being interrogated. Id. This 
amendment took effect on December 1, 2015. Id. Until this amendment, section 7B-2101 only precluded 
juveniles less than fourteen years of age from waiving the right to have a parent present. Id.
15. See generally All. for Justice, supra note 4 (discussing judicial overreach in the U.S. Supreme Court).





(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning: (1) [t]hat the 
juvenile has a right to remain silent; (2) [t]hat any statement the juvenile does 
make can be and may be used against the juvenile; (3) [t]hat the juvenile has a 
right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; and 
(4) [t]hat the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will 
be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants 
representation.19
Saldierna was also provided with written Juvenile Waiver of Rights forms.20 Saldierna 
indicated that he understood his rights by placing his initials next to each paragraph.21 
Saldierna also verbally indicated that he understood each right that Detective Kelly 
read to him by responding with “yeah” or “yes ma’am.”22 After acknowledging that 
he understood all his rights, Saldierna marked the option on the waiver form that 
read, “I DO wish to answer questions now WITHOUT a lawyer, parent, guardian, 
or custodian here with me,” and signed the form.23
 At 12:10 p.m, before the interrogation, Saldierna asked Detective Kelly, “[u]m, 
[c]an I call my mom?”24 Detective Kelly responded, “[c]all your mom now?” To which 
Saldierna replied, “I think she is on her lunch now.”25 Saldierna was then given an 
opportunity to call his mother.26 At 12:20 p.m., Saldierna returned from phoning his 
mother and Detective Kelly began to interrogate Saldierna.27 The interview continued 
for an hour, during which time Saldierna confessed to his involvement in the crimes.28 
 On January 22, 2013, Saldierna was indicted on multiple charges stemming from 
his involvement in the 2012 incident in Charlotte.29 On October 9, 2013, Saldierna 
filed a motion to suppress his confession to Detective Kelly.30 The motion was denied 
by the Mecklenburg County Superior Court on January 31, 2014.31 On February 20, 
2014, the superior court issued a written order outlining its findings of fact.32 The 
superior court determined that (1) Saldierna was properly advised of his rights 
19. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(a) (2015) (amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(b) (1998)).
20. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 328. Detective Kelly provided Saldierna with Juvenile Waiver of Rights forms 
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pursuant to section 7B-2101, which he understood and voluntarily waived, and (2) 
Saldierna requested to call his mother before the start of questioning, but never, at 
any time, made an unambiguous request to have his mother present during 
questioning.33 Based on these findings, the superior court made the following 
conclusions of law:
(1) That the State carried its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that 
[Saldierna] knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his juvenile 
rights. (2) That the interview process in this case was consistent with the 
interrogation procedures as set forth in [section] 7B-2101. (3) That none of 
[Saldierna’s]  State  or Federal rights were violated during the interview 
conducted of [Saldierna]. (4) That statements made by [Saldierna] were not 
gathered as a result of any State or Federal rights violation.34
On June 4, 2014, Saldierna pleaded guilty to two charges before the superior court, 
reserving a right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.35 
 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered, as a matter of first 
impression, whether Saldierna’s request to call his mother required Detective Kelly to 
clarify Saldierna’s request before continuing the interrogation.36 Saldierna argued that 
his request to call his mother “was not ambiguous[] and that he directly sought to have 
a parent present [during the interview].”37 Alternatively, Saldierna argued that even “if 
his request to call his mother was ambiguous, [Detective] Kelly was required to clarify 
whether Saldierna was invoking his right to have a parent present during a custodial 
interrogation as guaranteed by section 7B-2101.”38 The state argued that this case was 
controlled by U.S. and North Carolina Supreme Court precedent, which required a 
suspect to clearly, unambiguously, and unequivocally invoke a Miranda right and that if 
an ambiguous statement was made by a suspect, law enforcement had no obligation to 
stop questioning or clarify the statement.39 The state urged the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals to apply this controlling rule to a “juvenile’s right to have a parent present 
during questioning,” which is listed within the Miranda rights codified in section 
7B-2101(a).40
33. Id. at 329–30. There were a total of twenty-four findings of fact listed in the trial court’s order, id.; 
however, only the most relevant are listed, as they directly relate to the Saldierna court’s review.
34. Id. at 330.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 327.
37. Id. at 330 (alteration in original).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 332; see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994) (holding that a suspect must 
unambiguously and unequivocally invoke Miranda rights and law enforcement officers are not required to 
stop questioning or clarify a suspect’s ambiguous statement possibly invoking a Miranda right); State v. 
Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 224–25 (N.C. 2000) (applying the federal standard that requires the invocation 
of Miranda rights to be clear and unequivocal to also apply to juveniles in the state of North Carolina who 
invoke their Miranda rights pursuant to section 7B-2101).
40. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 333.
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 The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that a juvenile’s “right to have a 
parent present” was a state-imposed protection, established solely within section 
7B-2101(a)(3), and was not controlled by precedent concerning the invocation of 
Miranda rights, which must be unambiguously and unequivocally invoked.41 Thus, the 
Saldierna court established a new requirement applying only to section 7B-2101(a)(3) 
when it held “[t]hat an ambiguous statement touching on a juvenile’s right to have a 
parent present during an interrogation triggers a requirement for the interviewing 
officer to clarify the juvenile’s meaning” before proceeding with questioning.42
 In reaching this holding, the Saldierna court analyzed an amendment of section 
7B-2101(b), set to take effect December 1, 2015, that would require any juvenile less 
than sixteen years of age to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present before any 
questioning in a custodial interrogation.43 When Saldierna was arrested, section 
7B-2101(b) required any juvenile less than fourteen years of age to have a parent present 
during a custodial interrogation.44 The Saldierna court reasoned that the NCGA’s 
decision to raise the requirement age was reflective of an intent to further protect 
juveniles during “high-stakes and potentially life-altering procedure[s]” such as 
custodial interrogations.45 The Saldierna court also reasoned that the NCGA’s decision 
to amend section 7B-2101(b) lent significant support to its holding that police were 
required to clarify a juvenile’s ambiguous statement that possibly invoked a right to 
have a parent present.46 The Saldierna court thus vacated Saldierna’s conviction, 
reversed the superior court’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings.47
 This case comment contends that the Saldierna court erred in holding that law 
enforcement officers are required to clarify the meaning behind a juvenile’s ambiguous 
statement that possibly invoked the right to have a parent present during a custodial 
interrogation. First, the Saldierna court incorrectly distinguished and dismissed 
North Carolina Supreme Court precedent that indicated that section 7B-2101(a)(3) 
should have been held to the same invocation standard as the rest of the Miranda 
rights contained in section 7B-2101(a), requiring a juvenile to unambiguously invoke 
the right to have a parent present during a custodial interrogation. Second, the 
Saldierna court’s determination of the NCGA’s intent behind the creation and 
structuring of section 7B-2101 is contradicted and unsupported by the application of 
standard methods of statutory construction and interpretation, which show that the 
NCGA did not intend to hold section 7B-2101(a)(3) to a different standard than the 
41. Id. at 332–33.
42. Id. at 334.
43. Id.; see Act of June 4, 2015, ch. 58, pt. I, § 1.1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126 (codified as amended in 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101 (2015)).
44. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(b) (1998) (amended 2015).
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rest of the rights codified in the statute.48 Third, the Saldierna court erroneously 
relied on the prospective amendment of section 7B-2101 for significant support 
despite acknowledging that the amendment had no bearing or effect on the issue at 
bar. The Saldierna court’s decision demonstrates the effects of judicial overreach 
when courts interpret and shape legislation through holdings that conflict with the 
legislature’s intent.
 First, the Saldierna court incorrectly dismissed and distinguished precedent 
concerning the invocation of section 7B-2101(a)(3). In Davis v. United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that a suspect must unambiguously invoke a Miranda right 
for it to apply during a custodial interrogation.49 The Davis Court also held that law 
enforcement officers were not required to ask clarifying questions to a suspect who 
gave an ambiguous statement that possibly invoked a Miranda right.50 In State v. 
Golphin, the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Davis holdings and applied 
them to the juvenile rights contained in section 7B-2101.51 After Golphin, juveniles 
must unambiguously and unequivocally invoke a Miranda right, and law enforcement 
officers are not required to ask clarifying questions concerning a juvenile’s ambiguous 
statement that would possibly invoke such rights.52
 Applying Golphin, Saldierna’s request should not have invoked the protection of 
section 7B-2101(a)(3) because it failed to satisfy the unambiguous Davis standard.53 
Accordingly, Detective Kelly should not have been required to ask Saldierna 
clarifying questions to discern the meaning behind his ambiguous request. The 
Saldierna court acknowledged that Saldierna’s request to call his mother was “‘at best 
an ambiguous request’ and that [he] never made an ‘unambiguous request to have his 
mother present during questioning.’”54 In fact, Saldierna’s request was identical to the 
one made in People v. Nelson where the California Supreme Court held that a fifteen-
year-old juvenile’s request to “call his mother” during a custodial interrogation was 
not a clear and unequivocal invocation of any constitutional right.55 The Nelson court 
48. Sections 7B-2101(a)(1), (2), and (4) are the federal rights derived from Miranda, which include the right 
to remain silent, that anything a suspect says can and may be used against the suspect in court, and the 
right to have an attorney present during questioning. Id. at 332.
49. 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727–28 (1979) (requiring a 
suspect to a make an unambiguous invocation of rights).
50. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62.
51. 533 S.E.2d 168, 225 (N.C. 2000).
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. State v. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d 326, 331 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted).
55. 266 P.3d 1008, 1020 (Cal. 2012). The court found that the juvenile’s requests to speak with his mother 
were not sufficiently clear to require cessation of the questioning when he asked to call his mother to “let 
her know what’s happening” and “talk to her about it.” Id. at 1012. Compare id., with Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d 
at 331, 334 (holding that a juvenile’s request to speak with his mother was not an unambiguous request to 
have his mother present during questioning and required clarification by the interviewing officer). 
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determined that the juvenile’s request did not meet the Davis standard and did not 
require the law enforcement officer to clarify the juvenile’s intent behind the request.56
 Additionally, the North Carolina appellate courts had previously applied an 
unambiguous standard to section 7B-2101(a)(3). In State v. Smith, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court concluded that a sixteen-year-old juvenile invoked the right to have a 
parent present during questioning when he requested that his mother be brought to 
the station.57 The juvenile’s statement was an unambiguous invocation of his right to 
have a parent present during questioning and provided him the protection of section 
7B-2101(a)(3).58 In State v. Branham, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined 
that a sixteen-year-old juvenile invoked his right and protection under section 7B-2101 
when he asked to have his mother present during police questioning and when he 
instructed the police officers to write his request on paper.59
 The juveniles in both cases requested that their parents actually come to the 
station and be physically present during interrogation.60 These holdings are consistent 
with the common and generally understood definition of “present,” which means “at 
the particular place or event that is being referred to.”61 These requests directly 
contrast with Saldierna’s request to simply speak with his mother by telephone. At no 
time did Saldierna ask to have his mother physically with him—or present—at the 
location where he was being interrogated.62
 The Smith and Branham holdings recognize that an invocation of section 
7B-2101(a)(3) occurs when a juvenile makes an unambiguous request to have a parent 
actually present during questioning.63 These holdings are also consistent with the 
unambiguous invocation standard that the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted 
from Davis,64 and further support the position that section 7B-2101(a)(3) is held to 
the same invocation standard as the other rights enumerated in section 7B-2101(a).
56. Nelson, 266 P.3d at 1012, 1015.
57. 343 S.E.2d 518, 522 (N.C. 1986), abrogated by State v. Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (N.C. 2001). 
This case considered juvenile rights enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-595 (repealed 1998), which 
was recodified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(a) (2015), but the substance of subsection (a)(1)–(4) was 
not altered when the statute was recodified. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 332 n.3 (“The substance of [section 
7A-595(a)(1)–(4)] [is] indistinguishable from that in [section 7B-2101(a)].”). 
58. See Smith, 343 S.E.2d at 522.
59. 569 S.E.2d 24, 28–29 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
60. Smith, 343 S.E.2d at 519; Branham, S.E.2d at 26.
61. Present, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/present (last visited Oct. 
21, 2016).
62. See Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 330. But see State v. Reed, 590 S.E.2d 477, 2004 WL 77759, at *3–6 (N.C. 
Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2004) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a defendant did not clearly invoke a 
constitutional right when he said, “if you wait until my dad comes, I’ll tell you everything,” id. at *3).
63. See Smith, 343 S.E.2d at 522; Branham, 569 S.E.2d at 27–29; see also State v. Hunt, 306 S.E.2d 846, 
848–50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a sixteen-year-old’s request to have his parents present was an 
invocation of this right and subsequent interrogation by police without a parent present violated this right).
64. See State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 225 (N.C. 2000) (adopting the unambiguous invocation standard 
from Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 461–62 (1994)).
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 The Saldierna court dismissed Golphin, however, and reasoned that the Davis 
standard did not apply because it only controlled the federally established rights of 
section 7B-2101(a)—codified in subsections (1), (2), and (4)—and that subsection (3) 
was a special statutory right and different from the other enumerated rights within 
section 7B-2101(a).65 The court distinguished Smith and Branham by claiming that 
those cases do not control its analysis because they do not deal with a juvenile’s 
ambiguous request to invoke section 7B-2101(a)(3).66 Ultimately, the Saliderna court 
failed to apply any precedential or rational application and, instead, held section 
7B-2101(a)(3) to a new, higher standard that required law enforcement officers to 
clarify a juvenile’s ambiguous statement that may invoke the right to have a parent 
present during a custodial interrogation.67
 The creation of this new requirement, however, blatantly contradicts Golphin’s 
additional holding that law enforcement officers are not required to clarify a juvenile’s 
ambiguous statement that possibly touches on the invocation of a Miranda right.68 
The Saldierna court supported its decision to create the new clarification requirement 
by reiterating that section 7B-2101(a)(3) is an additional state statutory protection to 
juveniles, which goes beyond the normal rights and protections established in 
Miranda.69 The Saldierna court held that its review of section 7B-2101 revealed that 
the NCGA intended to hold this statutory right to a different standard of protection 
than the one afforded to the Miranda rights codified in section 7B-2101(a).70 The 
Saldierna court also reasoned that the new requirement “reflect[ed] the [NCGA’s] 
intent that law enforcement officers proceed with great caution in determining 
whether a juvenile is attempting to invoke this right.”71 This argument, however, was 
f lawed because the NCGA’s structuring72 of section 7B-2101(a) indicated that it 
intended all the listed rights to be held to the same invocation standard and did not 
intend to separate the standards, as the Saldierna court did.
 Second, the Saldierna court’s determination of the NCGA’s intent behind section 
7B-2101 is contradicted and unsupported by the application of standard methods of 
statutory interpretation and construction. In State v. Oglesby, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court recognized that it was “bound by well-accepted rules of statutory 
65. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 332–33.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 334.
68. See Golphin, 533 S.E.2d at 225.
69. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 332–33; see also State v. Fincher, 305 S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C. 1983) (holding 
that a juvenile defendant’s right to have a parent present during questioning is not derived from the 
Constitution, but from a state statute).
70. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 333.
71. Id.
72. The “structure” of section 7B-2101 refers to the intentional choice of words, phrases, and language, as 
well as the physical layout, punctuation, and joining of the phrases that compose the statute. See 
discussion infra pp. 183–86.
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construction.”73 In State ex rel. Hunt v. Reinsurance Facility, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed that the primary task of statutory interpretation was to 
ensure that the legislative intent is given effect.74 Legislative intent is identified by 
looking at the plain language of the statute,75 as well as the construction of the statute 
itself.76 Unfortunately, the Saldierna court never analyzed the plain language or the 
actual construction of section 7B-2101. Such analysis would have revealed that the 
NCGA’s intent in promulgating section 7B-2101 was unsupported by the Saldierna 
court’s determination that section 7B-2101(a)(3) was meant to be held to a different 
invocation standard.
 The Saldierna court failed to examine the plain language of section 7B-2101 in 
its analysis of legislative intent. In Oglesby, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
examined the plain language and meaning of section 7B-2101(a)(3), as well as the 
words the NCGA chose in creating it.77 The court decided not to adopt an alternative 
meaning contrary to the one expressed by the plain and unambiguous language used 
in the statute.78 In Oglesby, a juvenile in a custodial interrogation requested to speak 
with his aunt, attempting to invoke the right and protection of section 7B-2101(a)
(3).79 The court examined the plain language of section 7B-2101(a)(3) and held that 
the juvenile’s “aunt” did not qualify as a parent, guardian, or custodian as express in 
the statute.80 In the decision, the court explained that it was bound by the plain and 
unambiguous meaning of the language of the statute, which illustrated the NCGA’s 
intent in creating section 7B-2101.81
 Oglesby stands for the proposition that the NCGA likely intended section 
7B-2101(a)(3) to be invoked when a juvenile actually requested to have a parent 
present during questioning, provided the person requested was, in fact, the juvenile’s 
parent. The holding of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Smith directly supports 
this intent because it held that section 7B-2101(a)(3) was invoked when a juvenile 
specifically asked to have his parent brought to the station during his custodial 
interrogation.82 The North Carolina Court of Appeals also followed this intent in 
Branham when it determined that a juvenile invoked section 7B-2101(a)(3) when he 
73. 648 S.E.2d 819, 822 (N.C. 2007).
74. 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (N.C. 1981).
75. First Bank v. S & R Grandview, L.L.C., 755 S.E.2d 393, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
76. Elec. Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (N.C. 1991).





82. See State v. Smith, 343 S.E.2d 518, 522 (N.C. 1986), abrogated by State v. Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 
828 (N.C. 2001).
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specifically requested that his mother be present during his interrogation.83 The 
plain language the NCGA used in section 7B-2101 thus illustrates its intent.84
 The Saldierna court, however, never analyzed or discussed the plain language of 
section 7B-2101. Had it conducted such an analysis, it would have realized that the 
NCGA specifically intended “[t]hat the juvenile has a right to have a parent  .  .  . 
present during questioning.”85 This language shows that the NCGA did not intend 
section 7B-2101(a)(3) to be invoked by a juvenile’s request to speak, call, or “consult” 
with a parent.86 In actuality, the NCGA could have used all those words to indicate 
that subsection (a)(3) is triggered by even a juvenile’s broad request regarding the 
involvement of a parent in a custodial interrogation.87 Instead, the NCGA’s decision 
to narrowly construct subsection (a)(3) indicates that a juvenile’s request to have a 
parent present should be specific—consistent with the unambiguous requirement 
under Golphin.88
 The Saldierna court also never discussed the specific construction of section 
7B-2101 in its analysis. In Progressive American Insurance Co. v. Vasquez, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court indicated that when items appear in a list, joined by 
semicolons and the conjunctive word “and,” all the listed items relate to one another 
and are not to be treated separately.89 Section 7B-2101(a) contains four juvenile 
rights: subsections (1), (2), and (4) contain the federal rights enumerated in Miranda, 
and subsection (3) is the added state statutory right for juveniles to have a parent 
present during a custodial interrogation.90 These four rights appear in section 
7B-2101(a) in a list, joined by semicolons and the conjunctive word “and.”91
 This construction shows that the NCGA intended to have all the enumerated 
rights in section 7B-2101(a) held to the same standard of application and invocation 
and not to be separated as independent clauses held to individual standards, as the 
83. See State v. Branham, 569 S.E.2d 24, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
84. See First Bank v. S & R Grandview, L.L.C., 755 S.E.2d 393, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that 
“[t]he plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent”).
85. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(a)(3) (2015) (emphasis added) (amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(b) 
(1998)).
86. The NCGA specifically grants “[t]hat the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one 
will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants representation.” Id. 
§ 7B-2101(a)(4).
87. Arkansas specifically uses such language in its juvenile code, stating that law enforcement cannot 
question a juvenile who “[w]ishes to speak with his or her custodial parent, guardian, or custodian or to 
have that person present.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-317(i)(2)(c)(ii) (2016). Alabama uses a broadly 
constructed phrase, which states that a juvenile has a “right to communicate with his or her parent.” 
Ala. Code § 12-15-202(b)(4) (2016).
88. See State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 225 (N.C. 2000).
89. 515 S.E.2d 8, 11 (N.C. 1999).
90. State v. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d 326, 332 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
91. § 7B-2101(a). “There is no reason why punctuation, which is intended to and does assist in making clear 
and plain the meaning of all things else in the English language, should be rejected in the case of the 
interpretation of statutes.” State v. Bell, 115 S.E. 190, 192 (N.C. 1922) (citation omitted).
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Saldierna court concluded.92 After all, if the NCGA intended to hold section 
7B-2101(a)(3) to a different standard of application, as the Saldierna court argued,93 
it could have separated subsection (3) from the list of Miranda rights and indicated 
that it was an additional protection for juveniles, but subject to a separate heightened 
standard of invocation. That the NCGA did not use this alternative construction 
illustrates that its intent was to apply a single standard of invocation to all four 
enumerated rights. This intent contradicts the Saldierna court’s holding that a 
juvenile’s right to have a parent present should be held to a different invocation 
standard than the other rights enumerated in the same statute.
 Third, the Saldierna court supported its holding by citing to the NCGA’s 
amendment of section 7B-2101(b).94 In March 2015, the NCGA chose to amend 
section 7B-2101(b) to require any juvenile less than sixteen years of age to have a 
parent, guardian, or custodian present during police interrogation.95 This was the 
only change the NCGA made to section 7B-2101.96 Although the Saldierna court 
recognized that this change would not have applied to Saldierna, as he was already 
over sixteen years of age, it reasoned that the NCGA’s decision to raise the age 
requirement in section 7B-2101(b) was “instructive that the lawmakers elected by the 
citizens of [North Carolina] have determined that children only months younger 
than Saldierna can never waive the right to have a parental figure or attorney present 
during such a high-stakes and potentially life-altering procedure.”97 The Saldierna 
court used this amendment to support its conclusion “[t]hat an ambiguous statement 
touching on a juvenile’s right to have a parent present during an interrogation triggers 
a requirement for the interviewing officer to clarify the juvenile’s meaning.”98
 In Ray v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court considered the effect of prospective statutory amendments on current 
and pending cases.99 Prospective amendments that act to clarify current statutes—
amendments that do “not change the substance of the law but instead give[] further 
insight into the way in which the legislature intended the law to apply from its 
original enactment”—can be applied to and influence current and pending cases.100 
Prospective amendments that change the substance of the law only affect questions 
92. See Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 332–34.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 334.
95. Act of June 4, 2015, ch. 58, pt. I, § 1.1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126 (codified as amended in 
§ 7B-2101). Previously only juveniles less than fourteen years of age were required to have a parent, 
guardian, or custodian present during interrogation. Id.
96. See id.
97. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 334 (emphasis omitted).
98. Id.
99. 727 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 2012).
100. Id. at 681.
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of law occurring after the effecting date of the statute.101 The amendment of section 
7B-2101 is a substantive change as it changed the permissible age for a waiver of a 
parent’s presence. There is no clarification in the amended statute that would allow 
it to apply, in any fashion, to the inquiry before the Saldierna court. Therefore, the 
Saldierna court’s use of the prospective amendment in any way to support its position 
was misplaced and improper.
 Applying accepted canons of construction to the amended statute further 
undermines the Saldierna court’s holding. Legislative intent can be identified through 
the use of canons of construction,102 such as the reenactment doctrine103 or legislative 
silence.104 In State v. White, the North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
courts can determine legislative intent by examining the phraseology and word 
construction used in a statute, as well as the law as it existed before the statute was 
created or modified.105 In Scott v. Scott, a justice of the North Carolina Supreme 
Court stated: “I am pleased to see this [c]ourt return . . . to the undiluted application 
of the doctrine of statutory construction inferring legislative approval of the decisions 
of this [c]ourt from legislative silence in the face of those decisions.”106
 According to the reenactment doctrine, when a legislature reenacts a statute with 
unchanged and previously used statutory language and construction, it represents an 
implied approval of the prior administrative construction.107 Additionally, legislative 
silence during the reenactment process is persuasive evidence that the current judicial 
holdings and interpretations of the statute are correct and consistent with the overall 
legislative purpose of the statute.108
 Application of the reenactment doctrine reveals that the NCGA was satisfied 
with the phrasing and construction of section 7B-2101(a) as it only amended section 
101. See id.
102. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 Geo. L.J. 341 (2010) 
(discussing courts’ use of canons of construction in statutory interpretation to determine legislative 
intent behind the creation and construction of statutes).
103. See Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Duke L.J. 
1673, 1708 (2014) (discussing the emergence of the reenactment doctrine).
104. See Ron Villanova, Legal Method 114–16 (1999).
105. 294 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
106. 442 S.E.2d 493, 499 (N.C. 1994) (Mitchell, J., concurring).
107. Camp, supra note 103, at 1708; see also Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 76 (1946) (finding that 
the failure of the legislature to alter a statute after it had been judicially construed, and the subsequent 
reenactment of the same statute, is implicit recognition that the judicial interpretation is correct); Brown 
v. Brown, 196 S.E. 333, 335 (N.C. 1938) (holding that a presumption exists that the legislature knew 
what the judicial interpretation of a statute was when it reenacted the statute using the same language); 
Plemmons v. City of Gastonia, 302 S.E.2d 905, 907 (N.C. Ct. App. 1938) (stating that the legislature’s 
reenactment of “the operative portion of the statute, verbatim . . . emphasize[s] its satisfaction with the 
law as codified, and we are bound by such expressions of its intent”).
108. Scott, 442 S.E.2d at 499 (Mitchell, J., concurring); see Villanova, supra note 104, at 114–16.
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7B-2101(b), leaving the remaining portions of section 7B-2101 unchanged.109 
Additionally, the NCGA’s legislative silence concerning the unchanged portions of 
section 7B-2101 is persuasive evidence that the current judicial holdings concerning 
the application and protections of section 7B-2101(a) are consistent with the 
legislative intent behind promulgating section 7B-2101.110
 Judicial precedent does not hold a juvenile’s right to have a parent present during 
questioning to a different standard than the rest of the Miranda rights codified 
alongside it.111 Additionally, the current version of section 7B-2101 does not indicate 
that subsection (a)(3) should be held to a separate standard of protection or 
invocation.112 Lastly, the prospective section 7B-2101(b), effective December 1, 2015, 
does not hold subsection (a)(3) to a separate standard.113 If a legislature wants to 
achieve a specific result that is inconsistent with judicial precedent, the legislature 
must indicate “such an intent with unmistakable clarity.”114 The NCGA has made it 
clear that section 7B-2101(a) is to be held to a uniform standard of application and 
protection. Thus, the Saldierna court erred in holding that Detective Kelly was 
required to clarify the meaning behind Saldierna’s request to call his mother before 
continuing with her interrogation.115
 The Saldierna court’s holding illustrates the power of the judicial branch of 
government. The NCGA as the legislative branch of government in North Carolina 
had the responsibility and power to draft, approve, and enact section 7B-2101. 
Detective Kelly, under the authority of the North Carolina executive branch, applied 
section 7B-2101 first-hand to Saldierna during his arrest and interrogation. 
Ultimately, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, as the judicial branch, interpreted 
section 7B-2101 during its review of Saldierna’s appeal. These functions are 
109. Act of June 4, 2015, ch. 58, pt. I, § 1.1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126 (codified as amended in N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101 (2015)).
110. See Brown, 196 S.E. at 335 (noting that a presumption exists that the legislature knew what the judicial 
interpretation of a statute was when it reenacted the statute using the same language); Villanova, supra 
note 104, at 114–16. 
111. See State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 224–25 (N.C. 2000) (applying the federal standard that requires 
the invocation of Miranda rights to be clear and unequivocal to juveniles in North Carolina who invoke 
their Miranda rights pursuant to section 7B-2101); State v. Miller, 477 S.E.2d 915, 920–21 (N.C. 1996) 
(holding that a juvenile had effectively waived his right to have his mother present during questioning, 
resulting in no violation of his additional juvenile Miranda rights); State v. Smith, 343 S.E.2d 518, 521 
(N.C. 1986) (holding that a juvenile’s right, pursuant to the statute, to have a parent or guardian present 
during questioning is analogous to the right to counsel under Miranda and entitled to the same 
protection), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (N.C. 2001); see also In 
re W.R., 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (N.C. 2009) (noting that both Miranda warnings and section 7B-2101 
apply only to the custodial interrogation framework).
112. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(a) (2015).
113. See § 1.1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws at 126.
114. Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and 
Recent Trends 17–18 (2008).
115. State v. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d 326, 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
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exemplary of the separation of powers theory in application. Although the powers of 
each branch may have been separate, they were not equal.
 The Saldierna court, through its judicial power, transformed section 7B-2101(a) 
in both substance and application. The Saldierna court created a new requirement for 
section 7B-2101(a)(3) that was not intended or expressed by the NCGA when it 
created or amended the statute.116 This new requirement must now be followed by 
law enforcement officers when applying section 7B-2101(a)(3) in practice, even 
though the requirement is not codified in the language of section 7B-2101. Thus, 
the Saldierna court had the power to create, interpret, and apply legislation without 
restriction. In essence, this is a working definition of the tyranny that James Madison 
warned of back in 1788.117 Society should be cautious of judicial overreach disguised 
as application of statutory interpretation because it threatens the separation of 
powers.118
 Law does not bind a defendant until the court interprets and gives effect to the 
statutory commands present within the legislation.119 Judicial statutory interpretation, 
however, should be based on established principles and should only be employed 
when precedent does not control the issue at bar. The Saldierna court incorrectly 
dismissed and distinguished judicial precedent controlling section 7B-2101(a)(3). It 
dismissed the unambiguous Davis standard adopted in Golphin.120 It distinguished 
precedential rationales in Smith and Branham that further supported the position 
that section 7B-2101(a)(3) requires a juvenile to unambiguously invoke such right.121
 In reaching its holding, the Saldierna court failed to employ any standard methods 
of statutory construction or interpretation to support its position. It did not look at the 
plain language or the NCGA’s intentional construction of section 7B-2101. If it had, 
it would have realized that all four rights codified in section 7B-2101(a) were related 
and intended to be held to one universal standard. Further, the Saldierna court 
dismissed applicable canons of construction, such as the reenactment doctrine and the 
rule of legislative silence, which demonstrate that the NCGA was satisfied with 
judicial interpretations and applications of section 7B-2101(a)(3) because the NCGA 
chose not to change section 7B-2101(a) in the 2015 amendment.122
 The Saldierna court’s decision to require law enforcement officers to clarify a 
juvenile’s ambiguous statement that possibly invokes section 7B-2101(a)(3) is thus the 
result of misinterpreted legislative intent, improper analysis of precedent, and an 
116. See id. at 330–34 (creating a new requirement for law enforcement officers not specifically listed within 
section 7B-2101 and not implemented by the North Carolina Supreme Court in previous analyses of 
ambiguous invocations of juvenile rights); see also § 7B-2101(a) (amending only subsection (b) of section 
7B-2101 and leaving the remainder of the section untouched).
117. See The Federalist No. 47, supra note 1, at 245.
118. See Van Dresser v. Firlings, 24 N.E.2d 969, 970 (Mass. 1940).
119. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
120. Saldierna, 775 S.E.2d at 332.
121. Id. at 331–33.
122. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101(a) (2015).
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error in using prospective laws to inf luence current legal issues. Ultimately, this 
holding is an example of the judiciary’s power and ability to mold legislation, through 
statutory interpretation, to its own belief of how a law should be read, interpreted, 
and applied despite the legislature’s intent. This holding is also an example of judicial 
overreach and the threat such power has to the separation of powers within both 
state and federal government.
